POLICY TOOLKIT

on The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism
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### A. Legal Considerations

**Good Practice 1:** Seek coherence between domestic anti-crime and counterterrorism legislation, with regional and international legal conventions and protocols related to terrorism and transnational organized crime.  
**Good Practice 2:** Enhance anti-corruption legislation by strengthening integrity in state institutions, upholding the rule of law and discouraging the involvement of officials in illegal activities.

### B. Research and Information Sharing

**Good Practice 3:** Conduct additional research to increase understanding of all aspects of the nexus to develop context-specific responses based on evidence-based research.  
**Good Practice 4:** Standardize and strengthen research and analytical capabilities for more effective information sharing.
Good Practice 5: Establish effective communication channels with the aim of encouraging and improving, where possible, information sharing and cooperation between government and non-government actors, including academics and private sector researchers that operate at a local, national and regional level.

Good Practice 6: Encourage information sharing through the increased involvement of regional and international institutions.

Good Practice 7: Acknowledge and consult Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organisations as a relevant source of knowledge and on-the ground expertise.

Good Practice 8: Intelligence sharing should be prioritized, encouraged and facilitated among national governmental agencies and

Good Practice 9: Address issues of sharing of information within and between agencies as this could be beneficial in tackling the nexus at national level.

Good Practice 10: Encourage the creation, maintenance and use of regional and international databases.

Good Practice 11: Encourage the use of information from peripheral sources and new methods of information collection, including prison and financial intelligence.

Good Practice 12: Support the further development of private and public-sector partnerships to assist in combatting the nexus, including, but not limited to, the field of financial investigation.

C. Local Engagement

Good Practice 13: Effective dialogue and cooperation between state and non-state actors (local communities) needs to be established, based on mutual trust and understanding.

Good Practice 14: Empower communities to build resilience against transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Good Practice 15: Ensure that inputs from all sectors of society are considered when designing policies/initiatives, and ensure that these policies are context-specific.

Good Practice 16: Make sure that communities have access to basic services, and bolster employment and development through launching economic initiatives.
Good Practice 17: Support and enhance rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.

Good Practice 18: Acknowledge the role of the media as a target group and a facilitator by promoting greater awareness among journalists of the interface between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Good Practice 19: Coordinate with donors to maximize outcomes and avoid duplication of activities/interventions.

D. Capacity Building and Law Enforcement

Good Practice 20: Increase the awareness and capacity of relevant practitioners about the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Good Practice 21: Increase financial investigative capacities.

Good Practice 22: Increase capacities to monitor the cyber space.

Good Practice 23: Strengthen the capacity of the judicial systems to combat the nexus, and ensure that legal professionals are trained to recognize links between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Good Practice 24: Work with prisons and probation services to impede cooperation and transfer of skills and knowledge between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Good Practice 25: Prioritize and reinforce border security.
Section 1: Introduction to the Policy Toolkit

As a response to the growing concern of States regarding the nexus between transnational organized crime (TOC) and terrorism (often referred to as simply: the Nexus), the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has been working in partnership with the Netherlands under the umbrella of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism Initiative (hereafter: Nexus Initiative), to support the international community on this matter.

The Nexus Initiative foresaw the organization of four regional meetings, involving representatives from governments, international experts and practitioners, international and regional organizations and academia to discuss on existing knowledge and provide information on the relevant regional context. Each meeting addressed regional manifestations of the Nexus and challenges associated with it and addressed opportunities to tackle the Nexus in three main areas: (1) research and information sharing, (2) local engagement, and (3) capacity building and law enforcement. From the information and data gathered during the meetings, UNICRI developed the GCTF The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism. These were endorsed at the Ninth GCTF Ministerial Plenary Meeting in New York in September 2018 and presented at the United Nations (UN) Security Council Open briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the Terror-Crime Nexus in October 2018.

This Nexus Policy Toolkit (hereafter: Toolkit) marks the culmination of this process of research and consultation, and was designed to further support practitioners, policymakers as well as other governmental experts, to formulate responses and to translate the Good Practices into concrete actions. More specifically, the Toolkit will (a) help States to better understand this evolving phenomenon; and, (b) provide States with guidance on how to respond to the links between organized crime and terrorism. Finally (c) the Toolkit also provides definitions and watch points that facilitate its ‘monitoring’.

3 As a phenomenon of growing priority, numerous UN Security Council Resolutions have made explicit references to these links, calling for States to better address the nexus between organised crime and terrorism because of the threat it poses to security and development.
Defining the Concept

The nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism is, by nature, complex and dynamic. Where ties exist between TOC and terrorism, a range of peripheral and facilitating crimes are often also present. These manifest themselves in various ways, and are shown to have distinct characteristics in different regions. Growing numbers of case studies reveal that the Nexus has impacts across the globe. In extreme cases, the Nexus is seen as having a direct negative impact on security, contributing to the erosion of political, economic and social stability and development. Even in regions considered more stable and secure, the relationship between terrorist and criminal activities has been well documented and has acted as an enabler of terrorism. This relationship takes on a variety of manifestations that are displayed in different ways depending on whether the Nexus relates to an organization itself, or a transaction between two independent groups (i.e. a criminal group and a terrorist cell or group). At its most basic level, however, the Nexus pertains to the interaction between the two elements of organized crime and terrorism.

1. TRANSACTIONAL NEXUS

A ‘transactional’ nexus generally refers to the coming together of a criminal entity and a terrorist group to fulfill specific operational requirements. This ‘coming together’ manifests itself in two key ways: (1) an alliance, or (2) the appropriation of tactics through organizational learning. The first is laden with potential vulnerabilities and is not often seen to display itself as a long-term relationship; whereas the second highlights the ability of either a criminal or terrorist group to learn how to integrate the tactics of the other.

a. Alliances

Definition: An alliance refers to the functional (physical) merger, most commonly in the form of an ad hoc alliance, between a criminal group and (usually) a terrorist cell. Typically, alliances provide access to specialized knowledge (e.g. money laundering), specialized services (e.g. counterfeiting), operational support (e.g. access to a smuggling network), and/or financial support (e.g. collusion in bringing illicit products to market).

The ‘wildcard’ of alliances comes in the form of the ‘criminal intermediary’ who is engaged to facilitate access to illicit/illegal commodities (e.g. arms) or transactions (e.g. counterfeit documentation).
b. Appropriation of tactics

Definition: In this manifestation of the Nexus, a criminal or terrorist group will adopt the tactics of the other to bring in or develop in-house capabilities. For example, this covers situations of a terrorist group learning to engage in criminal activities as a source of financing or disruption, or a criminal entity carrying out acts of terrorism to elicit fear within a segment of society that they are seeking to influence or control.

In the current international environment, there are two associated concepts that are tied to the appropriation of tactics. One is ‘organizational learning’, and the second is ‘prison radicalization’.

Organizational learning essentially refers to the ability of a group to evolve over time by actively adapting to its operational environment. All organizations, whether licit or illicit, obtain knowledge from individuals within the group, from the group’s past failures and successes, and from other groups. It is through this process that groups will gauge the need to adopt new tactics, explore the uses of technology, shift their geographic focus, or target recruitment to obtain a required skill-set. Dissecting the evolution of various terrorist groups, and the composition of ad hoc militant cells, provides strong indications that some degree of organizational learning has taken place.

On one level, this is highlighted in evolving recruitment tactics, with substantial evidence indicating that recruits with criminal backgrounds not only accelerate radicalization, but that recruits with criminal experience are somehow prioritized.

Prison radicalization, or prison recruitment, has been identified as a very specific point of organizational learning that has had a significant impact on the increasingly nuanced evolution of the Nexus; particularly in the more politically stable countries of Western and Northern Europe. More pointedly, (former) prisoners - and by extension, community-based criminals - have increasingly become the driving individuals of many militant cells. This was seen as early as the 2004 Madrid attacks, perpetrated by several former criminals and financed through the sale of drugs; and regularly through to the more recent attacks perpetrated in Europe.

There is no doubt that prisons, as shown in various studies, are vulnerable to the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism by very nature that they bring together criminals and terrorists (or militant extremists) in a small space and specific time. This has proven to create opportunities for cooperation, networking, and the transfer / integration of skills.
2. ORGANIZATIONAL NEXUS

The 'organizational' nexus occurs when both criminal and terrorist activities occupy the same space and time. Within this manifestation of the Nexus, there are varying degrees of how criminal and terrorist activity overlap.

c. Integration

Definition: This refers to two distinct situations. First, it refers to the evolution of an alliance such that a criminal faction is integrated into a terrorist cell (or vice-versa). Second, it encompasses the targeted recruitment of a criminal group into a terrorist cell. The motivation for doing so is to acquire tactical capabilities within a potentially expedited time frame. This is not about recruiting individuals with a criminal background, but integrating a radicalized group of established criminals - often already based in the immediate community.

d. Hybrid

Definition: This manifestation of the Nexus accounts for the transformation of the core purpose/ideological foundation of a group. A hybrid entity will simultaneously display ideological and economic motivations by perpetrating acts of terrorism, and engaging in organized crime for profit maximization. The group in question can thus be equally defined as criminal or terrorist, and has the greatest potential of being overlooked by both anti-crime and counterterrorism agencies.

There are some very specific factors that help categorizing a group as one that is, by nature, hybrid in its modus operandi. These include: a notable change in leadership, a shifting membership base (often due to new recruitment strategies), the loss of centralized control due to a rise of independent factions or internal fractures, or the absence of leadership/competition for leadership at a local level.

e. Transformation

Definition: This is an evolutionary manifestation of the Nexus, and evident when a terrorist group evolves (organizationally and operationally) into a criminal network, or vice-versa. This is the most sophisticated manifestation of the link between transnational organized crime and terrorism, and one that requires ongoing group monitoring to identify since its emergence will depend on key watch points, such as a significant evolution in operations, leadership, recruitment base, and financing.

A transformation occurs when the ultimate aims and motivations of a criminal or terrorist group change to the point where the group no longer retains the original defining justification for their existence. In other words, it is no longer driven by the ideological or economic motivations that initially defined them as terrorist or criminal in nature.
The transformation of a group from terrorist to criminal has been documented with some frequency throughout the world, and in all cases has been driven by key changes in the group dynamics and composition. For example, the terrorist group has changed its rationalization from perpetrating acts of violence to amassing profits through criminal enterprise. The group often shows a lower intensity in its political demands, and a lower public profile. There is a notable reduction in attacks against ‘innocent’ civilian targets, unless those targeted are associated with profit making (e.g. piracy).

Criminal entities fundamentally evolving into a terrorist group has occurred with significantly less frequency; and is most often viewed as an exception to the rule. The one documented case is that of the Dawood Ibrahim group / D-Company.

f. Black Hole

Definition: The ‘black hole’ is less a manifestation of the Nexus, than the description of an extreme environment that breeds the nexus in many of its manifestations. By definition, the ‘black hole’ generally refers to a defined geographic area that lacks governance and security, and territorial control is often taken by groups that are able to gain control over the economy (usually unregulated, and often illicit) and people. Raising awareness of the ‘black hole’ scenario is tied to worst case scenario manifestations of the Nexus, where the convergence between these two activities and/or entities promote or sustain a condition of extreme insecurity whilst groups compete to secure economic and political power through extreme means (i.e. violence and criminal activity).

Conflict upheld by the existence of the Nexus share several characteristics. These include: lack of military objective and political order, perpetuation of instability to secure criminal activity, and perpetuation of violence to secure power needed to allocate the values and resources of a community.
Illustrative Examples: Regional Variations

How the nexus between crime and terrorism manifests itself at any given time is often a function of geography, and the overarching political and security environment.

In a policy context, highlighting regional variations of how the Nexus is manifested in certain jurisdictions simultaneously reveals the importance of a coordinated law enforcement, intelligence, and national security effort.

1. POLITICALLY STABLE STATES

The Nexus is mostly isolated to the transactional manifestation of the Nexus, particularly terrorist cells that engage in crime as a source of financing. In Europe, more specifically, there is also ample evidence of home-grown militant cells recruiting converted criminals into their operations, often leveraging shared community loyalties. In fact, studies conducted throughout Europe highlight that there are growing examples of terrorists with criminal pasts, who not only provide access to criminal expertise, but who are already desensitised to violence.

The Nexus in politically stable states manifests itself in ways that are less transparent and more adaptive to the environment than in less politically stable regions. Therefore, the Nexus may pose a potential greater threat in politically stable states than elsewhere. There is little doubt that the Nexus in this geography feeds the home-grown terrorism threat, and leverages the difficulties faced by law enforcement to differentiate between petty crimes (high volume, low cost) that facilitate terrorist enterprise, versus that which merely feeds a relatively benign local community problem.

2. TRANSITIONAL STATES

In transitional states, several variations of transactional and organizational displays of the Nexus have been evident through the years, with hybrid and transformational entities. Historically, poor border security, weak law enforcement, corrupt public officials, and established trafficking networks have facilitated the emergence of hybrid groups that have simultaneously sought political aims and profit maximisation, often benefiting from an interchangeable membership/recruitment base.

The Nexus in this type of geography is most accurately described as ad hoc because it is predominantly based on fulfilling immediate operational needs, and - unlike (post) conflict environments - not about perpetuating instability. Within these areas, the interaction between crime and terrorism tends to follow the trade in high value illicit commodities (e.g. narcotics, arms).
3. (POST) CONFLICT STATES

In these environments, the Nexus can be seen at its most interactive and developed phases. Places where government control is fragmented and often weak - foster collaboration between organized crime and terrorism. Given a context of instability, neither criminal nor terrorist groups display any innate loyalty to the state; as such, risk calculations made to cross the criminal-terrorist divide are based more on fulfilling immediate benefits rather than assessing longer term repercussions.

The maintenance of instability is a joint interest because it diminishes the legitimacy of central government in the eyes of the local population, creating the conditions conducive for criminal activities (illicit trafficking, recruitment in terrorism groups, etc.) and consequently for the proliferation of the Nexus.

Nexus Watch Points

Identifying ‘enablers’ in an environment that is conducive to the development or evolution of a nexus between organized crime and terrorism is a complex exercise. The minutiae of enabling factors are often region-specific and location-dependent (e.g. urban or rural, border areas), and they are further impacted by the broader socio-political environment (e.g. lack of government control, strict military presence) and the types of groups operating in those environments.

Acknowledging that environmental and organizational factors will impact how the Nexus manifests itself in a specific locality, and potentially how the Nexus evolves, there are several watch points that play an important - if not fundamental - role in this process.
## I. Environmental Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geography of operations</td>
<td>- Urban or rural proximity to borders, proximity to ‘ungoverned’ territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>- Extent of poverty in the main area of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Part(s) of the local economy dominated by illicit trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Socio-economic inequalities are visually prevalent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The community has shared financial dependencies with criminal or terrorist groups operating in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social status</td>
<td>- Inequalities of treatment among minority groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Change(s) in how minority groups are dealt with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security dynamics</td>
<td>- Illicit groups (criminal and/or terrorist) operate in areas with ‘porous’ borders, established trafficking routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Illicit groups share and/or are developing a co-dependency on these routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political landscape</td>
<td>- State of relationship between the government and security services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Existence of a rising ultra-conservative landscape / nationalist parties that could create resentment amongst minority groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>- Sign(s) of eroding capacity or influence of state institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Law enforcement capacity is being impacted by any political or other developments.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legislation is inconsistent or is incomplete to address organized crime and/or terrorism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>- State of corruption in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Impacts of corruption on segments of the public and private sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Systemic corruption resulting in vulnerability and undermining state institutions and security services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Existing concerns that state officials are being intimidated or bribed in order to facilitate criminal or terrorist operations and associated transactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Indication(s) that state institutions are being / have been infiltrated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### II. Organizational Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friction between senior ‘members’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The group is breaking down into factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notable loss in ‘members’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The leadership is insulated from or vulnerable to leadership challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability of the group to survive the loss of their current leader. In case of diffused leadership, what are the impacts on the group dynamics and operations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The recruits emanate from a new demographic of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a shift between staunch ideological recruits and newly radicalized recruits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The criminal / terrorist group is leveraging a ‘redemptive’ narrative - i.e. building a sense of belonging and community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The benefits of joining are purely economic, or involve financial incentives (particularly important for terrorist groups).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The place of recruitment is changing, i.e. from community and schools to prisons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are fundamental changes in what is attracting new recruits to the criminal or terrorist enterprise: economic security, social acceptance, moral assurances, or physical intimidation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The group’s internal capabilities and/or tactics are evolving/ changing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The balance between violence and criminality is changing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When capabilities to engage in acts of terrorism are impacted, the ‘terrorist’ group then focuses on financing through a criminal enterprise to force a ‘hybrid’ situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The group is diversifying its engagement in types of criminal activities to avoid over-dependence on one. As it enters new markets, there is a potential for cooperation or competition with another criminal or terrorist group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>External support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The groups benefit from some kind of popular support, e.g. the group is able to leverage (through sympathy or intimidation) a diaspora network. In such case, what is that network able to provide the group?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 2 - Good Practices and Knowledge Repository

The GCTF The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism (Nexus Good Practices) are non-binding practices developed by UNICRI as part of the Nexus Initiative. The Nexus Good Practices have been developed following different regional consultations and are intended to provide GCTF Members and other interested stakeholders with a non-exhaustive list of recommendations to assist them in developing policies and strategies to counter different manifestations of the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

The current section of the Toolkit builds on the Nexus Good Practices document, providing detailed guidelines and a framework on how to implement them.

Each of the points in this section follow the Nexus Good Practice document structure. Reflecting the Good Practices document, this Toolkit is divided into four main sections, covering priority areas where urgent action could be taken. The sections are (a) legal considerations, (b) research and information sharing, (c) local engagement, and (d) capacity building and law enforcement. The latter document should be consulted when referring to this section, for a more comprehensive reading and additional explanation on the context and the outlines of each good practice. The points under the good practices are structured using the following:

- **Key actions** - the steps to be taken to complement the good practice. Several key actions and steps are suggested per good practice.

- **Key actors** - key stakeholders at the local, national, regional, or international levels that can be involved in the implementation of the key actions. It is highly advised that due concern is given to ensure balanced gender representation when carrying out suggested actions.

- **Relevant international standard/documents** - official documents related to the good practice.

- **Examples** - past/ongoing initiatives relevant to the issues addressed by each good practice; the list is non-exhaustive.

The non-exhaustive list of non-binding recommendations presented below was prepared based on information and inputs collected during the regional meetings, integrated with good practices identified in fields of high relevance to the nexus.
A. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Good Practice 1: Seek coherence between domestic anti-crime and counterterrorism legislation, with regional and international legal conventions and protocols related to terrorism and transnational organized crime.\(^4\)

Key actions

- Step 1 - If national structures allow, establish a national legislation review body to assess and monitor the need to review the domestic anti-crime (specifically transnational organized crime measures) and counterterrorism legislation.
  
  Where necessary, States could consider the establishment of a (legislation) review body, responsible for monitoring the need of updating, amending or better linking the domestic legislation on transnational organized crime and terrorism in order to be more responsive to the evolving situation on the ground, considering the rapidly altering nature of the factors and conditions facilitating the Nexus.

- The review body could also be responsible for monitoring the implementation of anti-crime and counterterrorism legislation and the way they are linked to each other for preventing and countering the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism. The results of the monitoring process are complementary to the analysis carried out by the legislation review body. However, the monitoring would aim to identify the possible gaps and challenges in the implementation of the anti-crime and counterterrorism legislation, including the way they link to each other, from a more practical perspective. The monitoring mechanisms could be established in consultation with relevant stakeholders including government members, experts in the field, academia, practitioners, etc., and would be finally approved by the government. The monitoring could be considered an extremely useful means to verify possible changes within the same context, measure the impacts of specific laws in relation to such changes, identify possible discrepancies between the laws and the operational procedures, highlight the need to develop protocols, standard procedures, etc.

Step 2 - If national structures allow, review of relevant domestic legal instruments to improve their responsiveness in preventing and combating the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism, taking into account regional and international legal conventions and protocols that a country is a signatory to.

Government authorities could consider the review of domestic anti-crime and counterterrorism legislation, and the way in which the two legislative frameworks are linked to each other. Such reviews should have a specific focus on possible gaps in the domestic legislation and its inconsistencies with the regional and international legal conventions and protocols on terrorism and transnational organized crime, recommending possible solutions to align them. Attention should be given to the reinforcement and harmonization of policies and laws on privacy, including protection for witnesses and whistle-blowers\(^5\), as well as respect for human rights.

Key actors

- Policy makers.
- Law enforcement authorities (police, prosecutors, judges, border authorities, etc.).
- Local actors (academia, communities, NGOs, etc.).
- Regional and International institutions/organizations.

Relevant international standard/documents

- GCTF Valletta Recommendations Relating to Contributions by Parliamentarians in Developing an Effective Response to Terrorism, Recommendation 1

Good Practice 2: Enhance anti-corruption legislation by strengthening integrity in state institutions, upholding the rule of law and discouraging the involvement of officials in illegal activities.

Key actions

1. Step 1 - When States are not already assessed by relevant international bodies organizations, review, monitor and evaluate domestic anti-corruption legislation and general legislation which might facilitate corruption; where necessary, countries could reinforce anti-corruption laws if these appear insufficient, following the steps described under GP 1.

2. Step 2 - In accordance with national legislation, review of structures, practises and procedures within all organizations, levels and sectors of the state in order to assess and identify possible risk factors that could facilitate corruption.

3. Step 3 - Promote integrity among the private and public sectors to increase the resilience of organizations and prevent people from engaging in corruption. This can be done through awareness raising initiatives on conditions and behaviours, and/or the development of a code of conduct.

4. Step 4 - Building capacity of policy makers and other key actors to prevent, recognize and fight corruption in all its forms and manifestations.

Key actors

1. Public sector, including government institutions, at national and local level (policy makers, law enforcement, judiciary, civil servants, etc.).

2. Private sector, including international corporations and local companies.


Relevant international standard/documents

- United Nations Convention against Corruption, General Assembly resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003
- GCTF Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, Good Practice 15

Examples

- Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative: http://rai-see.org/
- Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), Council of Europe: https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco

B. RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SHARING

Good Practice 3: Conduct additional research to increase understanding of all aspects of the nexus to develop context-specific responses based on evidence-based research. 8

Key actions

- Step 1 - Identification of relevant stakeholders and assessment of research gaps and priorities:
  - Identify the different entities involved in research activities focused on the Nexus and organize consultations or other joint processes between representatives from the identified research entities, public and private sector, civil society organizations, government institutions and intelligence services, to identify gaps, priority areas (for further information, refer to GP 3) and to explore new potential partnerships in nexus-related research. Such process should clarify from an early stage what type of information and data that research aims to obtain, and what will be its final use.

8 See also GCTF, Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 2. www.theGCTF.org.
Step 2 - Establishment of research networks/teams/consortia/partnerships composed of researchers and analysts from universities, research centres, government and non-government institutions, intelligence, law enforcement agencies (LEAs), public and private sectors, civil society.

Step 3 - Development of relevant data collection and analytical tools that could be used to facilitate research activities aimed at further understanding:

- the different ways in which transnational organized crime and terrorism can be linked and occur in a region;
- organizational and operational issues associated with the nexus, including identification of potential points of vulnerability that could feed the further emergence of a particular manifestation of the Nexus;
- resilience factors of the nexus and common factors to both organized crime and terrorist groups that are found to encourage disengagement and de-radicalization.

Step 4 - Dissemination: The results of research carried out on Nexus-related topics should be shared with different stakeholders, to support the elaboration and implementation of nexus-related initiatives (connected with GP 15 and 19).

Key actors

- Academics.
- Analysts from government institutions, intelligence, LEAs, public and private sector.
- Researchers from civil society organizations.
- Policy makers.

Relevant international standard/documents

- GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 2

Examples

- Integrative Internal Security Governance (IISG) approach: https://wb-iisg.com/
- Research carried out by International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) on Western Europe (mentioned in Albania meeting summary)

GLOBSEC research and advocacy project on the “crime-terror nexus” in Europe: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/

The Program on the Trafficking/Terrorism Nexus in Eurasia: http://ipsr.ku.edu/trafficking/

PROTON, research initiative focuses on the processes of recruitment to organized crime and terrorist networks through an innovative integration between social and computational sciences: https://www.projectproton.eu/about/

Takedown project, investigates the role of social, psychological and economic aspects of the processes that lead to organized crime (including cyber related offenses) and terrorist networks and their impact on social cohesion: https://www.takedownproject.eu/overview/


Good Practice 4: Standardize and strengthen research and analytical capabilities for more effective information sharing.

Key actions

Step 1 - Assessment of methodological approaches to research and information sharing regarding how, when and where the nexus between organized crime and terrorism emerges (activity linked and facilitated by implementation of Step 2 of GP 3).

Organize technical consultations or other joint processes at the local, regional and international level with researchers, academics, LEAs, and high-level criminal intelligence analysts dealing with terrorism, organized crime and their possible links, to identify, discuss and share information on:

- current challenges to define research objectives;
- current challenges concerning the development and implementation of research methodologies applied to further understand how, when and where the nexus between organized crime and terrorism emerges (see issues mentioned in Step 3 of key actions in G.P.3);
- challenges in verifying how data and information are identified, collected and shared;
Step 2 - Definition of standard methodological approaches to research and information sharing.

Based on Step 1, organize technical consultations to define standard methodological approaches at the local and regional level, to help the formulation of appropriate research questions, promoting the optimization of resources and avoiding overlapping/unnecessary duplications of efforts. See below examples for support.

Key actors

- Academics.
- Analysts from government institutions, intelligence, LEAs, public and private sector.
- Policy makers.

Relevant international standard/documents

- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 28.2

Examples

- GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), a pan-European and North American network of serving and former counter-terrorism officials and academics with the aim to develop and promote more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions: https://www.globsec.org/initiatives/globsec-intelligence-reform-initiative/
- Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global): https://it.ojp.gov/global
**Good Practice 5:** Establish effective communication channels with the aim of encouraging and improving, where possible, information sharing and cooperation between government and non-government actors, including academics and private sector researchers that operate at a local, national and regional level.\(^9\)

**Key actions**

- **Step 1** - Exploring the current level of cooperation, coordination and information sharing between government and non-government actors, including academics and private sector researchers that operate at the local and regional level. Encourage surveys/informal interviews being conducted or other data collection activities involving all relevant stakeholders, with the aim to improve the understanding of the level of cooperation, coordination and information sharing among key-actors. It is important to stress that the aim of this process is not to assess the stakeholders' performance but to encourage and improve connections and synergies among them.

  - It can be considered to encourage government agencies to publish open source reports and analyses on their work for the public, which can be used by other relevant stakeholders for future research.

- **Step 2** - Formulation/revision/update of strategies/action plans/protocols/agreements to define cooperation, coordination and information sharing mechanisms between government and non-government actors, including academics and private sector researchers that operate at a local, national and regional level. The aim is to provide clear information on the role and responsibilities of each of the identified entities called upon to cooperate and share information where legally possible.

- **Step 3** - Organize regular consultations between entities from the research and the operational field, with the aim of identifying and discussing possible challenges, gaps and solutions related to the implementation of the strategies/action plans/protocols/agreements. Regular meetings could be also useful to develop and increase the level of trust, as well as the understanding of the important role that effective cooperation and information sharing may play in complementing and facilitating each entities' work.

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\(^9\) See also GCTF, Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 2. [www.theGCTF.org](http://www.theGCTF.org).
Key actors

- Government entities.
- Researchers from academia and other research entities.
- Intelligence analysts.
- Investigators from LEAs.
- Private sector analysts.

Relevant international standard/documents

- GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 2

Examples

- NATO Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Center: http://www.jallc.nato.int/activities/jointanalysis.asp
- The online Platform for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) - an interactive tool designed to engage online collaboration between practitioners actively working on PVE in Africa and the Middle East: https://pveplatform.forumbee.com/
- The Sahel Security College (CSS) aims to strengthen regional cooperation on counter terrorism and organized crime and currently focuses on Mauritania, Niger and Mali, with the possibility of expanding to other countries in the sub-region. http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/g5-sahel-security-college-inauguration
- The High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation of the European commission offer advice to European Union’s member States on: ways to improve cooperation among stakeholders and Member States; the further development of policies for the prevention of radicalisation; a mechanism for future structured cooperation in this area. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/high-level-expert-group-radicalisation-completes-work
**Good Practice 6: Encourage information sharing through the increased involvement of regional and international institutions.**

**Key actions**

1. **Step 1** - Where possible, key stakeholders such as government agents, law enforcement, intelligence, security agencies, etc. could adhere to initiatives (e.g. consultations, technical meetings, programs & projects, capacity building & awareness raising activities, etc.) involving regional and international institutions/organizations, aimed at identifying challenges and possible solutions to improve information sharing between States, critical to better addressing the conditions facilitating the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

2. **Step 2** - Where possible, and in line with the national legislation on data protection, States are encouraged to provide, on a regular basis, updated data required to keep databases up-to-date in the fields relevant to the Nexus (e.g. INTERPOL Notices, the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, Europol Information System, etc.).

3. **Step 3** - Where possible, and in line with the national legislation on data protection, States are encouraged to share with regional or international institutions/organizations information that could be relevant to better understand, prevent and counter the factors and conditions facilitating the Nexus, in all its forms and manifestations.

**Key actors**

- Government.
- Intelligence services.
- Law enforcement.
- Public security agencies.
- Private sector.
- Regional and international institutions/organizations.

**Relevant international standard/documents**

- GCTF *Recommendations for Using and Protecting Intelligence Information In Rule of Law-Based, Criminal Justice Sector-Led Investigations and Prosecutions, Recommendation 2*
Examples


**Good Practice 7: Acknowledge and consult Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organisations as a relevant source of knowledge and on-the-ground expertise.**

**Key actions**

- **Step 1** - Encourage recognition by the government (e.g. inclusion in national strategies, policies, regulations) of the potential role and contribution of NGOs and civil society organizations as a reliable source of in-country information and expertise. In order to avoid any possible risk of financing, or inadvertently providing support to entities associated with terrorism or organized crime, governments could establish appropriate vetting procedures and security checks for NGOs and CSOs, which should be context specific.

  It is important to mention the set of recommendations developed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF[^10]), the international standards-setting body for combating money laundering and preventing terrorism financing. Many of these recommendations include setting standards, which different entities, including non-governmental entities, must comply with. FATF also issued a document, which includes a number of Best Practices[^11] for combating the abuse of non-profit organizations, which refer to Recommendation #8 of the FATF.

- **Step 2** - Mapping exercise of Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organizations for potential engagement at the local and regional level. This should identify the type of organization, its area of action, and assess its capacities and resources to perform the required tasks.

- **Step 3** - Establish networks and promote partnerships between NGOs, CSOs and government agencies for the development and implementation of research initiatives on nexus-related topics.

- **Step 4** - Promote the inclusion of NGOs or CSOs as implementing partners in programs or initiatives which include on the ground research and expertise.


Step 5 - Involve NGOs or CSOs in consultations between relevant stakeholders to assess research gaps and priorities (see GP 3, Step 1), identify and discuss possible challenges, gaps and solutions related to the implementation of the strategies/action plans/protocols/agreements (see GP 5, Step 3).

Key actors

Governments.
NGOs and CSOs working on transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Examples


**Good Practice 8: Intelligence sharing should be prioritized, encouraged and facilitated among national governmental agencies and**

**Good Practice 9: Address issues of sharing of information within and between agencies as this could be beneficial in tackling the nexus at national level.**

Key actions

- Step 1 - National legislation and strategies which regulate and establish interagency cooperation and information sharing at the local, regional and international level should be periodically revised to ensure they are adequately responding to the evolving priorities related to the manifestations of the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

- Step 2 - National governmental agencies should establish and adhere to protocols/agreements/MoUs/other official procedures which encourage the cooperation and the exchange of information between agencies.

- Step 3 - National government authorities should encourage the development and the use of secure inter-agency databases or intranets, to ensure secure access to relevant data and facilitate information exchange (see also GP 10).

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12 GP 8 and GP 9 were merged due to their complementary and inextricable nature.
Step 4 - To address issues that inhibit information sharing between agencies and entities working on the facilitating factors of the nexus, fusion centres\textsuperscript{13}, or other field-based information sharing organizations that gather, analyse, and share comprehensive data/information, could be established.

Step 5 - Organize regular consultations between representatives of the fusion centre, government authorities, and policy makers to discuss possible reviews in national strategies, policies or laws which would better contrast the nexus phenomenon (see also GP 1).

Key actors

\begin{itemize}
  \item Government agencies: intelligence agencies, law enforcement, customs, border agencies.
\end{itemize}

Relevant international standard/documents

\begin{itemize}
  \item GCTF \textit{The Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector}, Good Practice 2
  \item GCTF \textit{Recommendations for Using and Protecting Intelligence Information In Rule of Law-Based, Criminal Justice Sector-Led Investigations and Prosecutions}, Recommendation 2, 3, 6 and 7
  \item GCTF \textit{The Hague - Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon}, Good Practice 10
  \item UN Security Council S/2015/366 Report of the Secretary-General on the threat of terrorists benefiting from transnational organized crime (2015), §78-80
\end{itemize}

Examples

\begin{itemize}
  \item INTERPOL's Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre (CTF): \url{https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism-Fusion-Centre}
  \item European Counter Terrorism Centre - ECTC: \url{https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc}
  \item Center for Terror Analysis (Center for Terror Analyse, CTA): \url{https://www.pet.dk/English/CenterforTerrorAnalysisCTA.aspx}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{13} For the scope of this document, a \textit{fusion centre} will be defined as a group of two or more agencies, working collaboratively and pooling together some or all of the following: their expertise, resources, information towards the centre, with the goal of maximizing their ability to prevent, respond and counter criminal or terrorist activity.
Good Practice 10: Encourage the creation, maintenance and use of regional and international databases.

Key actions

- Step 1 - Determine the agency (public or private) that has ownership of the database. This agency should engage in maintaining, checking and updating the database, and granting access to other institutions.

- Step 2 - Criteria of eligibility: identify which institutions can collect, review, upload, and access data and information into the database. Determine the classification of the data in the database, and a system to communicate this to the users to ensure appropriate protection of data. Consideration should be given to the issue of ethics in data collection, (amongst others, to ensure protection of privacy and respect for human rights) especially for sensitive data collection.

- Step 3 - Identify the needs and extent of the database (geographical scope, the topics covered and the type of information/data recorded).

- Step 4 - Technical development of the database: identify the service provider and define the security protocol.

- Step 5 - Give access to authorized institutions, based on the pre-established criteria and establish a ‘code of conduct’.

- Step 6 - Where possible, connect the database with other existing databases and platforms on the topic to ensure wider access to the information already available and avoid duplication of information. Public-private partnership (see also GP 12) would help getting access to private database.
Key actors

- Academics.
- Research institutes.
- Government agencies - depending on the scope and criteria of the database (e.g. law enforcement agencies, border agencies, judicial agencies, prison administration, etc.).
- Experts on data collection and dissemination.
- Regional and international organizations.

Relevant international standard/documents

- **INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data**: [https://rm.coe.int/interpol-s-rules-on-the-processing-of-data/168073ce01](https://rm.coe.int/interpol-s-rules-on-the-processing-of-data/168073ce01)
- **Europol Information System**: [http://library.college.police.uk/docs/APPref/Europol-information-system.pdf](http://library.college.police.uk/docs/APPref/Europol-information-system.pdf)

Examples

- INTERPOL databases: stolen passports, INTERPOL’s notices. [https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases](https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases)
- Global Terrorism Database: [https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)
- CEP’s Terrorists and Extremists Database (TED): extremist and terrorist leaders and operatives around the globe. [https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists](https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists)
- The Global Pathfinder database: includes terrorism events data in Asia-Pacific region, terrorist group profiles, counter-terrorism literature, training manuals
and legal documentation. [https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/research-programmes/global-pathfinder-database/#.W-QTBtVKg4g](https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/research-programmes/global-pathfinder-database/#.W-QTBtVKg4g)

- **Canadian Incident Database (CIDB):** provides data on terrorism and extreme crime incidents in Canada dating back to 1960: [http://www.extremism.ca/default.aspx](http://www.extremism.ca/default.aspx)

- **The International Crimes Database (ICD):** comprehensive database on international crimes adjudicated by national, as well as international and internationalized courts. [http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/AboutIcd/Project](http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/AboutIcd/Project)

- **The Terrorism and Political Violence Risk Map:** provides data and information on the risk of terrorism and political violence across six countries specifically: Egypt, France, India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States, and other country data generally. [http://www.aon.com/terrorismmap/](http://www.aon.com/terrorismmap/)

- **The Monterey WMD Terrorism Database:** catalogue of worldwide incidents weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by sub-state actors. [http://wmddb.miis.edu/](http://wmddb.miis.edu/)

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**Good Practice 11: Encourage the use of information from peripheral sources and new methods of information collection, including prison and financial intelligence.**

**Key actions**

Train government agencies (including LEAs and administrations) in using new sources of data and new methods of data collection and data analysis (see also GP 4).

- **Step 1 - Identification of peripheral sources of information to fill-in the knowledge gaps previously identified:** local police, financial institutions, local administration, prison staff, etc. can possess relevant information that could complement government agencies sources (see also GP 5).

- **Step 2 - Capacity building activities for government agencies:** Organize (multi-stakeholder) trainings on new and alternative methods of data collection and data analysis (online or face-to-face). Such training should cover the issue of ethics in data collection, (among others to ensure protection of privacy and respect for human rights) especially for sensitive data collection. Encourage participatory learning methods (use of practical tools, case studies, table top exercises, etc.).

- **Step 3 - Ensure that government authorities receive regular trainings and updates on new methods of data collection and data analysis.**
Key actors

- Government agencies (e.g. financial police, criminal police, intelligence units).
- Administration, in particular prison administration.
- Academia, research institutes.
- Private sector, including banks, accountants, lawyers, virtual currency exchanges or any other entity that may support financial investigation.

Relevant international standard/documents

- GCTF The Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector, Good Practices 2 and 15
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/177. Strengthening international cooperation in combating the harmful effects of illicit financial flows resulting from criminal activities (adopted on 19 December 2011)
- General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 7 and 28.1
- AUSTRAIC Regional Risk Assessment on Terrorist Financing - South East Asia
- RUSI's Report: The Role of Financial Information Sharing Partnerships in the Disruption of Crime
- Basel Institute on Governance AML Index - annual ranking assessing country risk regarding money laundering/terrorism financing

Examples

- Workshop on CT Prison Intelligence by the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law (IIJ) for 30 practitioners from various countries and regions. The workshop included the drafting of a Good Practice document as well as a template for a Memorandum of Understanding between prison administrations, law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the participating countries. https://theiij.org/events/workshop-on-counterterrorism-prison-intelligence/
Good Practice 12: Support the further development of private and public-sector partnerships to assist in combatting the nexus, including, but not limited to, the field of financial investigation.

Key actions

- Step 1 - Stakeholder mapping: identify key areas and related private actors which could support government agencies’ efforts to identify and combat the Nexus. Private sector companies collect, store and monitor large quantities of information/data, which, once analysed can be a useful indicator of organized crime or terrorism activities.

- Step 2 - Informal engagement: once identified, public and private actors should organize joint meetings or round-tables to discuss the basis of a partnership, including the nature, purpose and scope, common objectives, length and potential limits.

- Step 3 - Formalize the public-private partnership using the existing legal possibilities and channels to support the creation of a joint public-private task force or developing new ones when needed (see also GP 8-9).

Key actors

- Government agencies, including at national and local level (law enforcement, judiciary).

- Private sector, including banks, accountants, lawyers, virtual currency exchanges or any other entity that may notice suspicious transactions.

- Other sector-specific entities that operate in high-risk jurisdictions, and who monitor the operations of organized crime and terrorist groups (e.g. logistics companies, extractives, tobacco and pharmaceutical companies).

Relevant international standard/documents

- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/224, Towards global partnerships

Examples

Kenya: The Financial Intelligence Unite (FIU) created a set of indicators to support the reporting of suspicious transactions. Partners from the private sector provide reports on suspicious transactions to the FIU, which give feedback on the type of information to be included in such reports (expert information). Republic of Kenya Financial Reporting Centre: http://www.frc.go.ke/downloads.html

United Kingdom: Project Griffin introduced by the City of London Police and Metropolitan Police in 2004 is a joint partnership with the private sector security industry to raise awareness in relation to counterterrorism and law enforcement issues. http://globalinitiative.net/initiatives/giresilience/

C. LOCAL ENGAGEMENT

Good Practice 13: Effective dialogue and cooperation between state and non-state actors (local communities) needs to be established, based on mutual trust and understanding.

Key actions

Step 1 - Identify neutral and reliable representatives from each party involved (local communities and government agencies) to initiate the dialogue. They will be meeting regularly and be responsible for disseminating information among their community.

Step 2 - Train local representatives from local communities and government agencies on key aspects to facilitate the establishment of a partnership, including on dialogue and communication, psychology, social and religious issues, safety and security, crime prevention and reporting (with a specific focus on organized crime and terrorism). Train government officials to effectively engage with communities.

Step 3 - Build trust and partnerships between government agencies and local communities. This can be done in different ways, including: guaranteeing transparency and accountability in the government’s actions; being mindful of the 'do no harm' principle; adopting soft approaches such as implementing.

14 The principle of “do no harm” requires organizations to integrate conflict-sensitivity wherever it is relevant. The principle is now used widely by many aid organizations, including governments and multilateral organizations. OECD (2010), Conflict and Fragility: Do no Harm - International support for state building, https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/do%20no%20harm.pdf; Anderson M. B. (1999), Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace.
community-oriented policing, establishing whistle-blower and witness protection programs.

- **Step 4** - Develop joint projects promoting local activities and benefits and ensuring local actors are the main implementers and beneficiaries.
- **Step 5** - Establish a reporting mechanism to enable local communities to report information to government agencies, including law enforcement agencies. This mechanism can take different forms such as a platform, app, website, dedicated phone number, direct reporting, etc.

**Key actors**
- Government agencies and administrations, especially local actors (city council, law enforcement, judiciary).
- Local communities, including youth, women, local associations and NGOs, religious leaders, etc.

**Relevant international standard/documents**

- GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practices 10 and 18
- GCTF The Hague - Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon, Good Practice 1
- GCTF Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as tools to Counter Violent Extremism, Good Practices 1 and 2
- GCTF Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”
- OSCE (2014), Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach
- United Nations General Assembly A/70/674, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, §49, 51 and 52

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15 Community-oriented policing, or community policing, is a strategy for encouraging the public to act as partners with the police in preventing and managing crime as well as other aspects of security. For further information: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Manual on Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peace Operations.

Section 2 - Good Practices and Knowledge Repository

- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/224, Towards global partnerships

Examples

- **Kenya**: Nyumba Kumi Community Policing Initiative aims at eliminating the fear of crime and social disorder, through joint problem solving and prevention of crime. [http://www.communitypolicing.go.ke/about.html](http://www.communitypolicing.go.ke/about.html)
- **Pakistan**: The Inclusive Security project brought together a diverse group of women leaders from civil society, police, and parliament to impact processes and dialogues focused on countering terrorism and violent extremism with the aim to increase women’s inclusion in security efforts as a core component of efforts to stabilize Pakistan and the region. [https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Pakistan-CVE-Case-Study.pdf](https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Pakistan-CVE-Case-Study.pdf)
**Good Practice 14: Empower communities to build resilience against transnational organized crime and terrorism.**

**Key actions**

- **Step 1** - Map existing research and activities to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity of actions. Make use of existing good practices on building resilience against violent extremism and define the empowerment scheme. The agency or organization should clearly define the purpose, scope, objectives, duration, activities, and actors involved in the scheme. This should be done in close partnership with the local community directly and/or through NGOs active in the region.

- **Step 2** - Implementation of the empowerment scheme including a range of local actors and institutions, such as civil society and NGOs, educational institutions, religious leaders, prison administrations, the judiciary, etc.

- **Step 3** - Monitoring and evaluation: The implementing agency or organization should monitor and assess all activities implemented in the framework of the empowerment scheme to ensure the objectives have been achieved and to assess whether further actions / adjustments are necessary.

**Key actors**

- Government agencies and administrations, at national and local levels (ministries, police, city council, prison administration, etc.).

- Local communities, including youth, women, local associations and NGOs, educational institutions, religious leaders, etc.

- Regional and international organizations.

**Relevant international standard/documents**


United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/224, Towards global partnerships.

Examples

- **UNICRI-EU Community Engagement Project to counter CVE in the Sahel Maghreb:** The Pilot Project seeks to launch, implement and evaluate innovative projects aimed at preventing and countering radicalization, terrorist recruitment and violent extremism in the Sahel-Maghreb region and disseminate lessons learned and best practices. [http://www.unicri.it/topics/counter-terrorism/countering_violent_extremism_Sahel_Maghreb/](http://www.unicri.it/topics/counter-terrorism/countering_violent_extremism_Sahel_Maghreb/).

- **Indonesia:** Cooperation with youth on how to use social media and disseminate information on de-radicalization. See for example: [https://theglobepost.com/2017/11/27/indonesia-youth-radicalism/](https://theglobepost.com/2017/11/27/indonesia-youth-radicalism/).


- **Mexico, Central America and South Africa:** The #GIResilience Project by the Global Initiative analyzes community resilience in the context of organized crime and promotes the capacities of local communities to fight criminal governance themselves with ongoing pilot projects. [http://globalinitiative.net/initiatives/giresilience/](http://globalinitiative.net/initiatives/giresilience/).
**Good Practice 15:** Ensure that inputs from all sectors of society are considered when designing policies/initiatives, and ensure that these policies are context-specific.

**Key actions**

- **Step 1** - Government agencies should always ensure proper and timely information sharing to all sectors of society concerning new policies and initiatives impacting their area.

- **Step 2** - Involve local actors: government agencies could organize open meetings, forums or round-tables giving the opportunity to all sectors of society to invest in the design and implementation of future policies and initiatives impacting their area.

- **Step 3** - Encourage the launch and implementation of policies and initiatives by local actors themselves, especially local communities (see also Good Practices 14), with the practical and technical support provided by the government to ensure inclusion of marginalized and remotely located communities.

**Key actors**

- Government agencies and administrations, at national and local levels (policy makers, city council).

- Local communities, including youth, women, local associations and NGOs, religious leaders, etc.

- Educational institutions (universities, regional centres, etc.).

- Policy makers.

**Relevant international standard/documents**

- GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practices 7 and 11

- GCTF Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as tools to Counter Violent Extremism, Good Practices 4, 5 and 6

- GCTF Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 1

- United Nations General Assembly A/70/674, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, §51 and 52

- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/224, Towards global partnerships
Examples

Kenya: Multi-stakeholder P/CVE forum launched by the Kwale County Commissioner involving 50 youth and human rights-focused agencies and organizations, as well as representatives from the National Counter-Terrorism Centre and local donor embassies to discuss implementation of the county P/CVE plan. http://kecosce.org


Pakistan: The national P/CVE guidelines in Pakistan attempt to include a wide range of national and sub-national authorities and non-governmental actors to create a “bottom-up,” multi-stakeholder consultative process involving more than 300 representatives from different levels of government and parts of society in the country. https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/final.pdf

Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Macedonia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Sub-Saharan Africa: The Mother Schools project follows a bottom-up security approach that includes civil society to address the dangers of extremism while fostering dialogue between local stakeholders and global decision-makers in twelve countries across Western and Eastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. https://www.women-without-borders.org/

Good Practice 16: Make sure that communities have access to basic services, and bolster employment and development through launching economic initiatives.

Key actions

Step 1 - Assess the current situation of the community to determine their main challenges and needs, including: access to basic services and infrastructure (such as water, healthcare, education, transport, etc.); employment situation, in particular for marginalized populations and remotely located communities; unemployment as a source of informal and illicit activities; type and level of crime infiltration in the community, level of vulnerability and resilience to criminality.

Step 2 - Based on the assessment, governments should promote action and initiatives aiming to ensure access to basic services and infrastructure to all
citizens, including in particular: access to water and healthcare infrastructure\(^7\); basic education and alphabetization for all; economic infrastructure (e.g. transport systems and utility networks).

- **Step 3** - Based on the assessment and in close cooperation with local actors, governments should identify, promote and support education and employment opportunities in the regions largely impacted by unemployment.

- **Step 4** - Raise awareness amongst local communities about informal economies and the risks and consequences associated with it (link to GP 14). This can be done through different ways, including, for example, awareness raising campaigns, public information, training, use of Media, or any other local means.

**Key actors**

- Government agencies.
- Local communities, including youth, women, local associations and NGOs, educational institutions, religious leaders, etc.
- Private sector.
- Development agencies.
- International organizations.

**Relevant international standard/documents**

- GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 16
- United Nations General Assembly A/70/674, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, §54
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/224, Towards global partnerships

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\(^7\) For further information, please refer to UN HABITAT (2013), Guide to Finance Infrastructure and Basic Services, https://unhabitat.org/books/guide-to-financing-infrastructure-and-basic-services/.
Examples

Philippines: The Country worked with the private sector to develop the guidelines “Red Flags on Equality and Diversity in the Workplace”, voluntary principles that promote equality, diversity and equal opportunities. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/926869/red-flags-inclusive-diverse-workplace-international-alert-mindanao-business-council


Middle East, North Africa: Silatech aims to combat unemployment, extremism and the marginalization of women and youth through employment and economic empowerment initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa. https://www.silatech.org/

Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger: The Peace through Development II project (PDEV II) assists communities in Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso to increase their resilience to violent extremism by addressing socioeconomic, political and cultural drivers of violent extremism. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/PDEV%20II%20Fact%20Sheet%20%28Nov%202016%29.pdf

Kenya: The Ummah Initiative is a community development initiative working towards youth socio economic empowerment and prevention or countering of violent extremism. https://ummahinitiative.com/
Good Practice 17: Support and enhance rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.

Key actions

- Action 1: Support rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) programs.
  - Step 1 - Inform local actors and communities about the aims and benefits of R&R and organize public discussion giving the opportunity to local actors and communities to invest in the elaboration and implementation of R&R programmes and to discuss the possible role of each actor in the R&R process. Organize regular multi-stakeholder meetings involving prison administration, local communities and actors; local authorities, etc.
  - Step 2 - Assessment of the country situation in terms of R&R:
    - Assessment of the prison situation, including the profile of the prison population, the existing range of education, training and work activities in the prison, the legal, financial and practical boundaries, etc.
    - Assessment of existing rehabilitation programs in prison.
    - Assessment of existing systems for reintegration after detention and preventing recidivism (reference to GP 24).
  - Step 3 - Design and implementation of R&R programs. Based on the assessment, define the purpose, scope, objectives, duration of the program and sets out the specific role and duties of each participant.
  - Step 4 - Monitoring and evaluation. The implementing agency or organization should monitor and assess the efficacy of the R&R programs to ensure the objectives have been achieved and to determine whether further actions/adjustments are necessary.

- Action 2: Create a referral mechanism18 (see also GP 14 on empowerment scheme).
  - Step 1 - Inform local actors and communities about the aims and benefits of the referral mechanism.
  - Step 2 - An assessment should be carried out to determine which government agencies and non-government organizations (CSOs/NGOs) should be involved in the design, implementation and monitoring of the mechanism, what structure might be most effective in a particular country/region, and what issues require most attention.

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18 "A Referral Mechanism is a co-operative framework through which state actors fulfil their obligations to protect and promote the human rights of [trafficked] persons, co-ordinating their efforts in a strategic partnership with civil society". OECD (2004), National Referral Mechanisms. Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons. A Practical Handbook.
Step 3 - Establish a (formal) agreement that clearly defines the purpose, scope, objectives, duration of the referral mechanism and sets out the specific role and duties of each participant.

Step 4 - Implementation of the referral mechanism ensuring a high-level of cooperation and inclusion of all relevant government agencies and local actors. Involved actors should be trained on practical aspects, including: protection and promotion of human rights; how to identify and treat victims; how to protect victims from physical and psychological harms; how to provide support services.

Step 5 - Monitoring and evaluation. The implementing agency or organization should monitor and assess the efficacy of the referral mechanism to ensure the objectives have been achieved and to determine whether further actions/adjustments are necessary.

Key actors

Government agencies and administrations at national and local levels (prison administration and staff, city council).

Local communities, including youth, women, local associations, CSOs and NGOs, educational institutions, counsellors, religious leaders, etc.

Universities, research institutes.

Relevant international standard/documents

- GCTF Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, Good Practices 1, 20 and 23
- GCTF The Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector, Good Practice 11
- GCTF Good Practices on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), Good Practices 9, 10 and 15
- GCTF Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 10
- OSCE (2014), Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach
- UNODC (2017), Roadmap for the Development of Prison-based Rehabilitation Programmes
Examples

- UNCRI’s programme on R&R of VEOs. http://www.unicri.it/topics/counter-terrorism/rehabilitation/
- ICCT project on Engaging Civil Society Actors in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders and Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/March-2016-CSO-Rehab-synopsis-EN.pdf

**Good Practice 18:** Acknowledge the role of the media as a target group and a facilitator by promoting greater awareness among journalists of the interface between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Key actions

- Step 1 - Media should promote education and awareness on the Nexus among their journalists. Journalists could be offered training on understanding the Nexus, how to safely investigate and collect specific information, and how to protect sources in nexus cases, etc.
- Step 2 - Media and journalists collecting information and evidence on nexus activities could where possible inform government agencies, especially law enforcement, in a timely manner and provide requested data.
- Step 3 - Encourage media to serve as a communication platform for local and national actors involved in preventing and countering the Nexus and its facilitating crimes, and to raise awareness of the Nexus among a broader (target) audience.

Key actors

- Media, all types (TV, press, radio, social media, etc.).
Government agencies and administration, at national and local level (e.g. police, judiciary, city council).

General public, local communities, NGOs.

Universities, research institutes.

Local, regional and international organizations.

**Relevant international standard/documents**

- GCTF *Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as tools to Counter Violent Extremism*, Good Practice 8
- GCTF *Zurich-London Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online*
- United Nations General Assembly A/70/674, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, §55

**Examples**

- **Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP):** a non-profit media organization committed to transnational investigative reporting and promoting technology-based approaches to exposing organized crime and corruption worldwide. [https://www.occrp.org/](https://www.occrp.org/)

- **Kenya:** Handbook on Reporting Terrorism by Media Council of Kenya and International Media Support, is a tool for Kenyan media professionals who are reporting on issues of terrorism and whilst doing so seek to counter violent extremism. [https://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/en/mck/images/Downloads/A-handbook-on-reporting-terrorism.pdf](https://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/en/mck/images/Downloads/A-handbook-on-reporting-terrorism.pdf)

Good Practice 19: Coordinate with donors to maximize outcomes and avoid duplication of activities/interventions.

Key actions

- Step 1 - Develop activities and interventions by putting in place a mapping exercise of the existing initiatives and (where appropriate) developing national and/or regional action plans.
- Step 2 - Ensure coordination among stakeholders and donors by promoting regular exchange of information, setting up regional and international databases on funded initiatives, and putting in place regional coordination mechanisms.

Key actors

- Ministries / government agencies.
- Law enforcement.
- Private donors.
- Key beneficiaries.
- Research institutions.
- International and regional organizations.
- Local communities, including youth, women, local associations and NGOs and religious leaders.
Relevant international standards/documents

- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1 “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (25 September 2015), Goal 17
- GCTF Zurich-London Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online, Good Practice 4

Examples

- The Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism initiative (WBCTI), supported by the EU aims to integrate all forms of international assistance that concern increasing the capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization leading to terrorism in the Western Balkans. It is directed at avoiding duplication of actions by international actors [https://wbcti.wb-iisg.com/](https://wbcti.wb-iisg.com/)

D. CAPACITY BUILDING AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Good Practice 20: Increase the awareness and capacity of relevant practitioners about the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Key actions

- Step 1 - Training Needs Assessment (TNA). Conduct surveys on the nexus among relevant practitioners to identify specific training needs in different countries and regions in order to inform capacity building programmes and policy development (link with GP 3). Special attention should be paid to training needs in specific areas such as:
  - Correctional systems, as convicted perpetrators of organized crime and terrorism can develop nexus connections and networks in prison settings (refer to GP 24);
  - Border control, as enhancing the capacity of border guards to identify suspicious flows of persons and / or goods is key to identifying and countering the manifestations of the nexus (refer to GP 25).

- Step 2 - Design and deliver training activities reflecting the most recent research findings and the outcomes of the TNA. Specific training should be provided on the collection of identifiers and the comparison of biodata. Furthermore, the importance of enhancing inter-service cooperation at all levels should be appropriately stressed.

- Step 3 - Promote follow up initiatives involving former training participants to operationalize the learned techniques and strategies at the ground level.

Key actors

- Ministries.
- Governmental agencies.
- Police.
- Law enforcement officers.
- Border guards.
- Prison officials.
- Intelligence agencies.
Military (when appropriate).
Research institutions.
Training and academic institutions.
International and regional organizations.
Regional observatories on the nexus.

Relevant international standards/documents

- GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 19
- GCTF Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, Good Practices 2 and 3

Examples

- UNODC research work on the nexus in the context of the E4J programme
- UNICRI Programme on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. Since 2012 UNICRI has been supporting UN Member States, upon request, in their efforts to build effective rehabilitation programmes for violent extremist offenders (VEOs) to ensure that prisons are not serving as hotbeds of radicalization. In particular, UNICRI has delivered a wide range of training activities for prison personnel, including prison managers, psychologists, social workers and religious leaders https://www.unicri.it/topics/counterterrorism/rehabilitation/
- UNODC Online Counter-Terrorism Learning Platform. This platform has developed into a fully integrated interactive tool, training criminal justice officials from around the world in the fight against terrorism and strengthening their cooperation in this area https://ctlp.unodc.org/login/index.php
**Good Practice 21: Increase financial investigative capacities.**

**Key actions**

- **Step 1** - Establish a dialogue among the competent national authorities, and where appropriate, the private sector, to assess the capacity building needs in the field of financial investigations. Stimulate connection of relevant security authorities and public actors in the financial domain.

- **Step 2** - Set up tailored technical assistance programmes to establish or reinforce FIUs in line with the outcomes of the national assessment.

- **Step 3** - Develop guidelines for the identification of financial flows related to the nexus crimes and crimes facilitating the nexus defining specific risk indicators.

- **Step 4** - Enhance where possible the exchange of information among public sector entities (FIUs, prosecutors) by establishing coordination mechanisms (e.g. interagency taskforces and fusion centers).

- **Step 5** - Enhance, when appropriate, the exchange of information between public authorities and relevant private sector entities by establishing information exchange platforms.

- **Step 6** - Promote private-public capacity building initiatives, including training for personnel of banking institutions and financial sector operators to enable early detection of nexus related transactions (refer to GP 11).

- **Step 7** - Review the existing legal framework to assess whether it enables the relevant national authorities to perform investigations and, where appropriate, promote reforms.

**Key actors**

- Ministries.
- Governmental agencies.
- Police.
- FIUs (where applicable).
- Financial police.
- Banking institutions.
- Judicial sector - Prosecutors.
- Intelligence agencies.
- Research institutions.
Training and academic institutions.
International and regional organizations.

**Relevant international standards/documents**

- **GCTF The Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector, Good Practice 15**
- **United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/177. Strengthening international cooperation in combating the harmful effects of illicit financial flows resulting from criminal activities (adopted on 19 December 2011)**
- **General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 7**

**Examples**

- **Kenya Asset Recovery Agency.** The Asset Recovery Agency was established in 2015, it is a small agency with limited staff. It handles high level corruption and fraud cases, and works together with key law enforcement agencies (Ethics and Anticorruption Commission, intelligence, National police) pursuing a multi-agency approach. Select the targets to be investigated, such as persons of interest (and their communication networks) and mobile money transactions.  [http://frc.go.ke/assets-recovery-agency/](http://frc.go.ke/assets-recovery-agency/)

- **Financial Investigations in the Western Balkan project by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) aims to develop and sustain institutional capacity in fighting transnational organized crime and financing terrorism and to promote active networking among Western Balkan law enforcement officials**  [https://www.cepol.europa.eu/media/news/financial-investigation-service-training-western-balkan-project-first-newsletter-released](https://www.cepol.europa.eu/media/news/financial-investigation-service-training-western-balkan-project-first-newsletter-released)

- **UNODC - World Bank** The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) supports international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds. StAR works with developing countries and financial centers to prevent the laundering of the
proceeds of corruption and to facilitate more systematic and timely return of stolen assets [https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/StAR.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/StAR.html)

UNICRI Asset Recovery Programme - supported by the European Union. Through its Office in Brussels UNICRI assists States in asset recovery. This work is carried out by providing specialized case-by-case mentoring for States who have been victims of stolen assets which are the product of corruption and related crime [http://www.unicri.it/topics/asset_recovery/](http://www.unicri.it/topics/asset_recovery/)

**Good Practice 22: Increase capacities to monitor the cyber space.**

**Key actions**

- **Action 1:** Capacity building activities to disrupt online nexus activities.
  
  - **Step 1** - Organize consultation meetings with competent authorities to identify specific capacity building and technical assistance needs.
  
  - **Step 2** - Develop and deliver training programs for key governmental agencies’ officials and relevant practitioners focusing on the challenges identified through the consultations. The relevant areas may include: deep web monitoring; risk assessment of social media; tracing and seizing virtual currencies; use of big data analytics; use of data forensic; implementation of 24/7 monitoring systems and deployment of cyber patrols.

- **Action 2:** Establish specific rosters of experts to support governmental agencies in specific technical areas, such as: deep web monitoring, use of big data analytics for the detection of criminal activities, tracing and seizing virtual currencies.

- **Action 3:** Stimulate exchange between policy makers, experts and practitioners working on organized crime, terrorism and cyber security.

- **Action 4:** Promote international police cooperation.
  
  - Facilitate the exchange of information and digital evidence between national law enforcement (refer to GPs 6, 8, 9 and 10).

- **Action 5:** Adapt national legislation and organizational structures.
  
  - **Step 1** - Ensure, where possible, that the national legislation and organizational structures allow effective exchange of information between law enforcement agencies, intelligence and the judicial sector.
Step 2 - Promote reforms where appropriate.

Action 6: Improve the IT infrastructure. Provide technical assistance and financial support to the states whose network infrastructures need improvement.

Action 7: Promote synergies and strong partnerships with private sector operators (e.g. ISPs and social media corporations) - refer to GP 12.

Key actors
- Ministries.
- Governmental agencies.
- Police.
- 24/7 monitoring expert teams.
- Military (when appropriate).
- Judicial sector - Prosecutors.
- Intelligence agencies.
- Internet service providers.
- Telecommunication companies.
- Research institutions.
- Training and academic institutions.
- International and regional organizations.

Relevant international standards/documents
- GCTF Zurich-London Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online, Good Practices 5, 9
- G-8 24/7 Network for Data Preservation Protocol
- Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime (24/7 network)
Examples

Tech Against Terrorism is a UN-mandated project which aims to build the capacity of tech companies to prevent their platforms from exploitation by terrorists and violent extremists, while also respecting human rights https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/

The Clean IT project aims to establish a constructive public-private dialogue about terrorist use of the Internet and to identify “best practices" which, after possible modification, could in the opinion of the Clean IT participants contribute to a successful reduction of the impact of terrorist use of the Internet https://www.cleanitproject.eu/


EUROPOL Cyber Intelligence Service https://europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/intelligence-analysis/cyber-intelligence/

Good Practice 23: Strengthen the capacity of the judicial systems to combat the nexus, and ensure that legal professionals are trained to recognize links between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Key actions

- Action 1: Capacity building activities for judges and prosecutors.
  - Step 1 - Organize consultation meetings with competent authorities to identify specific capacity building and technical assistance needs related to the identification, prosecution and sentencing of the nexus related crimes.
  - Step 2 - Design and deliver training programs for prosecutors and the judiciary sector at large focusing on the areas identified through the consultation meetings.

- Action 2: Establish regional thematic fora in the context of the existing networks of prosecutors to promote the exchange of knowledge and experiences on the nexus and the discussion of the surrounding challenges.

- Action 3: Legal and technical assistance.
  - Step 1 - Provide ad hoc technical and logistical assistance to prosecutors (upon request of the competent authorities).
  - Step 2 - Analyse the national legislation to identify the norms enabling to prosecute the nexus crimes specifically, and promote reforms where appropriate.
Key actors

- Ministries of justice.
- Judges and prosecutors.
- Academia.
- Research and training institutions.
- International and regional organizations.

Relevant international standards/documents

- **GCTF** *The Hague Memorandum on Good Practices for the Judiciary in Adjudicating Terrorism Offenses, Good Practice 1*
- **GCTF** *Valletta Recommendations Relating to Contributions by Parliamentarians in Developing an Effective Response to Terrorism, Recommendation 3*
- Document on the REMJA process - “Document of Washington” (29 November 2012)
- Council of the European Union Decision 2005/671/JHA
- CoE recommendation Rec (2000)19 06/10/2000 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system
- CoE recommendation CM/Rec (2012)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the role of public prosecutors outside the criminal justice system

Examples

- **Eurojust** is the EU agency dealing with judicial cooperation in relation to serious crime affecting two or more EU member states. It also hosts liaison prosecutors from some non EU member states. [http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/](http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/)
- European Judicial Network in criminal matters (EJN), The European Judicial Network in criminal matters (EJN) is a network of national contact points for the facilitation of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. [https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/](https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/)
- International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) works with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism: [https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/](https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/)
- International IP Crime Investigators College is an interactive online IP crime training facility with the mission to deliver leading edge training to enable
investigators around the world to effectively combat current and emerging threats from transnational organized IP Crime [https://www.iipcic.org/](https://www.iipcic.org/)

- Capacity Building of Law Enforcement and Judiciary-programs within the CT-Morse initiative by the EU aims to implement counter-terrorism related criminal justice reforms and to respond to training needs in countries in the Greater Horn of Africa, West Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa [http://ct-morse.eu/projects/](http://ct-morse.eu/projects/)

- UNICRI Programme on Asset Recovery. Through this programme UNICRI has provided judiciary technical assistance to Egypt and Tunisia since 2016 [http://www.unicri.it/topics/asset_recovery/](http://www.unicri.it/topics/asset_recovery/)

Good Practice 24: Work with prisons and probation services to impede cooperation and transfer of skills and knowledge between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Key actions

- Action 1: Increase prison capacity to impede the convergence between convicted criminals and terrorists / violent extremist offenders, while ensuring respect of the internationally recognized human rights standards. This may involve:
  
  - Promoting technical assistance programmes to support countries in the assessment of the vulnerabilities of their prison systems;
  - Mapping the existing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes;
  - Designing standard training programmes for prison wardens aiming at raising awareness on the nexus;
  - Promoting the enhancement or establishment of prison intelligence services.

- Action 2: Promote probation services as a mean to impede nexus phenomena.
  
  - Encourage the establishment of probation services in the countries where they have not yet been developed;
  - Identify and promote measures to enable probation officers to detect and share information on possible nexus connections.
Key actors

- Ministries.
- Government agencies.
- Prison Administration.
- Academia.
- Training and research institutions.
- NGOs.
- International and regional organizations.

Relevant international standards/documents

- GCTF Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders
- IIJ, Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization
- UNODC (2015), Handbook on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence
- UNODC (2017), Roadmap for the Development of Prison-based Rehabilitation Programmes
- United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules)

Examples

- UNICRI’s program on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
  http://www.unicri.it/topics/counter-terrorism/rehabilitation/
- UNODC assists Member States in breaking the cycle of re-offending by providing prison administrations with technical guidance on how to initiate and/or enhance rehabilitation programmes, in close coordination with other (non-)governmental stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector
UNODC/EU project to contribute to strengthening the rule of law in the Kyrgyz Republic through improvement of prison management and social reintegration of offenders, and enhanced multi-agency coordination and policy development on crime prevention and criminal justice

UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa works with UN Member States and their relevant institutions to: strengthen legislative, regulatory and policy frameworks; protect vulnerable groups and promote human rights; establish standards for prison staff training and skill development; address social reintegration needs of prisoners and find alternative to imprisonment, strengthen legislative, regulatory and policy frameworks; protect vulnerable groups and promote human rights; establish standards for prison staff training and skill development; address social reintegration needs of prisoners and find alternative to imprisonment

UNODC’s Programme in Southern Sudan to assist the process of prison reform in Sudan. In partnership with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and in cooperation with the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR), UNODC has developed a program to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Southern Sudan Prison Service (SSPS) and improve its ability to meet international human rights standards as part of the overall development of the criminal justice system

The Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons (CVE-P) Program by the Global Center encompasses a series of targeted trainings, technical assistance, and ongoing support to prison authorities to improve the management of VEOs and to effectively identify and address radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism in prisons
https://www.globalcenter.org/project-descriptions/countering-violent-extremism-in-prisons-cve-p-program

ICCT The Hague - Mali (Dis-)Engagement and Re-Integration related to Terrorism (MERIT). As part of the ICCT Rehabilitation & Reintegration programme, the MERIT project, focusing on Mali, targets both the prison environment as well as communities outside prison to facilitate effective reintegration and to reduce the risk of radicalisation in the larger population, especially among youth
https://icct.nl/project/countering-violent-extremism-in-mali/
**Good Practice 25: Prioritize and reinforce border security.**

**Key actions**

- Step 1 - Promote regional studies investigating how organized crime and terrorist groups exploit porous borders. Such studies may focus on identifying existing trafficking routes, human flows and networks that are being exploited for nexus activities.
- Step 2 - Support the establishment of regional / international bodies and informal networks promoting cross-border cooperation, information sharing among intelligence services, and regional joint operational task forces.
- Step 3 - Provide technical and logistical support for the implementation of regional joint operational task forces.
- Step 4 - Provide training for border guards, police and customs to enhance awareness of manifestations of the Nexus and build capacity on effectively addressing the Nexus.
- Step 5 - Provide, where appropriate, logistical and financial support for the digitalization of border systems and the use of information such as API and PNR, ensuring respect of local and international privacy and data protection norms.

**Key actors**

- Ministries.
- Border agencies.
- Customs.
- Border police.
- Security agencies.
- International and regional organizations.
Relevant international standards/documents

- GCTF Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, Good Practices 1, 3, 4
- Resolution 2195 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7351st meeting, on 19 December 2014, point 5
- Resolution 2396 (2017) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8148th meeting on 21 December 2017

Examples

- The Engaging Communities in Border Management in Niger Project by the IOM aims to promote dialogue and participation of the border communities with the authorities, to improve the capacity of the Government of Niger in terms of humanitarian and security crisis response at the border as well as to strengthen cross border cooperation [https://www.iom.int/news/iom-niger-launches-project-engage-communities-border-management/](https://www.iom.int/news/iom-niger-launches-project-engage-communities-border-management/)