Transnational organized fisheries crime

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• US$ 10-23.5 bn annually
• Eastern Central Atlantic (West Africa): 37% of all fishing is illegal
OUTCOMES MARINE LIVING RESOURCE CRIMES:

• HABITUAL ORGANIZED CRIME COMMITTED BY TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Patagonian toothfish)
  • Small group of large actors (e.g., Hout Bay Fishing/Bengis)
  • Modus operandi
    • FOC/flag hopping, flag brokers (Österblom et al, 2009; EJF, 2012)
    • Renaming (EJF, 2007)
    • Front companies and secrecy jurisdictions (HSTF, 2006)
    • Coordinated defense strategies
    • Transshipments/fish laundering
    • Document fraud, corruption
    • AIS/VMS switched off
Who should coordinate cross-border fisheries crime related law enforcement and information exchange?
Does the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime apply to fisheries crime?

Art 2 of UNTOC:

(b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty;

Article 73 of the Law of the Sea Convention:

3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.
(How) can we overcome the law enforcement gap created by flag States that are unable or unwilling to exercise their responsibility in accordance with international law?
How can detection, investigation and prosecution of transnational organized fisheries crime become more resource efficient and effective?